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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2012, “Patents and Public Rights: The Questionable 
Constitutionality of Patents before Article I Tribunals After Stern 
v. Marshall”1 published in the North Carolina Journal of Law and 
Technology. Since the article’s publication, its arguments, or 
permutations of its arguments, have been incorporated into various 
challenges to the constitutionality of the Article I USPTO’s patent 
invalidation power. A number of these challenges remain pending 
today.2 
This article addresses several common counterarguments raised 
in opposition to the constitutional challenges. In this regard, it is 
intended as a reply, and argues: 
I. McCormick Was Decided on Constitutional Grounds; 
II. Litigants and Lower Courts Mischaracterize the Supreme 
Court’s Public Rights Rule of Law; 
III. The Stakes Couldn’t Be Higher. 
I.  MCCORMICK WAS DECIDED ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS 
The Supreme Court’s 1898 McCormick decision features 
prominently in the various challenges to the USPTO’s 
constitutional authority to invalidate issued patents for intellectual 
property.3 Given that McCormick held that the revocation of issued 
                                                
 1 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 287 (2012). 
 2 By way of background, Cooper v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016), and MCM 
Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016), were re-listed by 
the Court after end-of-summer conference before eventual denial; a brief-in-
opposition was requested in Cooper v. Square, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 475 (2016), 
before denial; in Oil States Energy Services, LLC, v. Greene's Energy Group, 
LLC, No. 16-712 (U.S. cert petition filed Nov. 29, 2016), the Court recently 
directed the USPTO to submit its otherwise-waived response—cert conference 
remains unscheduled; Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc., No. 17-
517 (Fed. Cir. filed Jan. 13, 2015) and Security People, Inc. v. Lee, No. 16- 
2378 (Fed. Cir. filed July 8, 2015), submitted to the Federal Circuit petitions for 
hearing en banc—in both instances, the Federal Circuit recently requested 
opposition briefs. Importantly, the complete Supreme Court (i.e., nine Justices) 
has yet to consider the constitutional question (cert stage). 
 3 See, e.g., Cooper v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016); Cooper v. Square, Inc., 137 
S. Ct. 475 (2016); MCM, 137 S. Ct. 292; Oil States (No. 16-712); Cascades 
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patents by the Article I Patent Office constitutes “an invasion of 
the judicial branch of the government by the executive,”4 its 
inclusion is not surprising. What is surprising, however—the 
express language of McCormick aside—is that the Federal Circuit 
held in its precedential December 2, 2015 MCM decision that 
McCormick was decided on statutory (as opposed to constitutional) 
grounds.5 
In practical terms, this means that the USPTO’s adjudicatory 
authority over issued patents is a mere question of statutory 
convenience per the executive and legislative branches. Thus, 
should the executive and legislative branches determine that issued 
patent invalidity is better resolved in a “one-stop shop” Article I 
solution, the matter is a question of statutory authorization and 
little more. 
To be fair, this conclusion is the necessary and correct result 
stemming from the Federal Circuit’s holding that patent invalidity 
is a “public right.”6 Definitionally, “public rights” are 
administrative claims belonging to the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Those branches may invite the judiciary’s 
participation, but are under no obligation to do so. “Private rights,” 
conversely, are claims protected under the Constitution, and 
constitute the core of the Article III judicial power. 
In this regard, the interpretation of McCormick necessarily 
decides the underlying private right versus public right question. 
McCormick was decided some forty-two years after Murray’s 
Lessee (discussed infra), and any conclusion that a particular claim 
                                                                                                         
Projection (No. 17-1517); Security People (No. 16-2378); In re Depomed, Inc., 
No. 16-1378, 2017 WL 676604 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2017). 
 4 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman Co., 169 U.S. 606, 612 
(1898). 
 5 MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). See also Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent 
Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. SCL. & TECH. L.J. (Apr. 3, 2017, v. 5) (forthcoming 
2017) (evaluating favorably the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that McCormick 
was decided on statutory grounds). 
 6 See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified on 
reh’g, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226 
(Fed. Cir. 1992); MCM, 812 F.3d 1284. 
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does or does not have a constitutional guarantee also implicitly 
clarifies the underlying private right–public right dichotomy. 
Where a private right is guaranteed Article III resolution, where a 
public right may be resolved before an Article I administrator, with 
optional (per Congress) Article III supervision, a decision 
committing resolution of the claim to an Article I or Article III 
court clarifies the private right–public right determination. 
The interpretation of McCormick is thus very important, and 
the Federal Circuit recognized as much in MCM. Nonetheless, 
MCM marks the first time since McCormick’s publication in 1898 
that a federal court has identified it as ruling on statutory, and not 
constitutional, grounds.7 Curiously, the Federal Circuit in MCM 
declined to address, or even acknowledge, its own prior conclusion 
in Patlex that McCormick was decided on constitutional grounds. 
As the Federal Circuit itself identified in MCM, however, Patlex 
binds it absent en banc intervention, and thus presumably 
discarded Patlex’s holding regarding McCormick as dictum. Given 
that Patlex sought to resolve the potential unconstitutionality of ex 
parte reexamination, a determination that Patlex’s review of 
McCormick is dictum unworthy of mention in a parallel case 
reviewing the potential unconstitutionality of inter partes review is 
peculiar. 
It is argued that the language of McCormick is, at best, 
ambiguous. To the contrary, the language of McCormick is, on its 
face, clear, and in any event, the McCormick case was not decided 
in a vacuum. Instead, the decision represents the culmination of 
nearly three decades’ worth of Supreme Court decisional authority 
establishing the constitutional rights inherent to all patent owners, 
both in the land and intellectual property contexts. The McCormick 
decision is thus replete with citations and pin citations to the 
Court’s own authority. It is from these constitutional cases that the 
McCormick holding is derived. 
                                                
 7 Consider, for example, recent commentary from Judge Robinson (D. Del.) 
noting “the national implications of patent litigation—constitutional rights 
reviewed first by a federal agency and ultimately by a national, not regional, 
court of appeals . . .” Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. OmniVision Technologies, 
Inc., No. 1:16-CV-00290-SLR (D. Del Apr. 22, 2016) (emphasis added). 
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Assuming arguendo that the unequivocal language of the 
McCormick decision is ambiguous, any interpretation is defined by 
the authority from which the McCormick holding is derived. As the 
review below will demonstrate, the Supreme Court cases relied 
upon in the McCormick decision are unmistakably constitutional, 
and thus any conclusion that McCormick was decided statutorily 
and not constitutionally is not merely improbable, but impossible. 
A. The McCormick Court Evaluates Patent Reissue Procedure 
Reissue procedure at the time of the McCormick decision 
allowed a patentee to submit his patent for reissue under limited 
circumstances. Importantly, it was the patentee who voluntarily 
initiated the reissue process. For example, if the patentee discerned 
“any error [in, e.g., the specification] which may have been found 
to have arisen from his inadvertence or mistake,” then that patentee 
could pursue a “reissue” of the original patent correcting the 
identified problems.8 A patent examiner then reviewed the reissue 
application and could cancel claims from the original patent (but 
not in the original patent) as a precondition to “reissuing” the 
amended patent. 
Pursuant to this procedure, once initiated, the patentee 
submitted his patent to the Patent Office, which then retained 
physical custody over the patent. Once the “new” patent was ready 
for reissue, the patentee then voluntarily “surrendered” the original 
patent back to the Patent Office. The “new” patent reissued with its 
errors corrected. 
The question certified for the Supreme Court by the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, was what legal effect, if 
any, the patentee’s refusal to surrender the original patent at the 
conclusion of the reissue process had where the patent examiner 
identified a number of claims in the original patent as 
unpatentable. Stated differently, but for the voluntary surrender of 
the patent by the patentee, could the Patent Office cancel claims 
from an issued patent for intellectual property during the reissue 
process? 
                                                
 8 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 610. 
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B. The Express Language of the McCormick Decision 
The short answer from the Supreme Court was an emphatic 
“no.”9 For an opinion purportedly addressing the statutory 
authority granted to the Patent Office by Congress, it is peculiar 
that the statute is hardly mentioned at all. Interestingly, where the 
statute is discussed, it is for the purpose of identifying the intent of 
the patentee in submitting the application for reissue.10 
Specifically, per the Court “[t]he object of a patentee applying for 
a reissue is not to reopen the question of the validity of the original 
patent, but to rectify any error [arising from inadvertence or 
mistake].”11 This suggests a potential endorsement of consent 
doctrine—that is, but for voluntary surrender of the patent by the 
patentee to the Patent Office, the Patent Office lacks constitutional 
authority to reconsider questions of invalidity.12 
The language of the statute thus hardly factors in the 
McCormick opinion. It is implausible that a decision devoted to 
resolving the scope of statutory authority committed to the Patent 
Office by Congress would largely decline to address the statute, or 
even identify the relevant section(s) conferring invalidation power. 
It is further implausible that in a “statutory” decision the Court 
would include numerous citations and pin citations to its 
constitutional, separation of powers authority. Consider the 
following passage from McCormick. By its text alone, the opinion 
is clear: 
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that 
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of 
the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, 
and has affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has 
passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, 
and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the 
President, or any other office of Government. It has 
                                                
 9 See generally McCormick, 169 U.S. 612. 
 10 Id. at 610. 
 11 Id. 
 12 And if the act of voluntary surrender is the revocation, no statutory 
provision can dictate the intent of the patentee. Under this scenario, the statutory 
authorization argument is an illogic. 
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become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled 
to the same legal protection as other property. The only 
authority competent to set a patent aside, or to annul it, or 
to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested in the courts 
of the United States, and not in the department which 
issued the patent.13 
Consider the McCormick passage again, now with its cited and pin 
cited authority italicized for emphasis: 
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that 
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of 
the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, 
and has affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has 
passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, 
and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the 
President, or any other office of Government. United States 
v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378; United States v. Am. Bell 
Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363. It has become the 
property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same 
legal protection as other property. Seymour v. Osborne, 11 
Wall. 516; Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, United 
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 271, citing James v. 
Cambell, 104 U.S. 356. The only authority competent to set 
a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct it for any reason 
whatever, is vested in the courts of the United States, and 
not in the department which issued the patent. Moore v. 
Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533; United States v. Am. Bell 
Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364; Michigan Land & 
Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589, 593.14 
To the extent that the cited decisions were resolved on 
constitutional grounds, it necessarily follows that McCormick was 
resolved on constitutional grounds. There is no alternative 
interpretation. 
                                                
 13 169 U.S. at 608-09 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 14 Id. 
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C.  Review of McCormick’s Cited Constitutional Authority 
In order to demonstrate that McCormick is constitutional 
authority, each sentence, and each cited case, from the above 
passage is evaluated in turn. The passage begins: 
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that 
when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of 
the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, 
and has affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has 
passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, 
and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the 
President, or any other office of Government. United States 
v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378; United States v. Am. Bell 
Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363.15 
United States v. Am. Bell16 is a highly important case, perhaps 
just as important if not more so than McCormick, and there the 
Court sought to determine whether the Government had the 
constitutional authority to pursue a bill in equity for the 
cancellation of two patents for intellectual property fraudulently 
obtained. Although the Court held that the Government had the 
constitutional authority (absent statutory authorization, analogizing 
to land patents) to pursue relief against the patentee, the Article III 
courts nonetheless retained the authority to revoke the patents in 
such a suit. Specifically, the Court differentiated between the 
“special privileges” issued from the King of England as 
prerogatives of the Crown, which could be annulled by order of the 
King, and the property rights inherent to all patent owners in the 
United States. In the Court’s words: 
We have no king in this country; we have here no 
prerogative right of the crown; and letters patent, whether 
for inventions or for grants of land, issue not from the 
President but from the United States. The President has no 
prerogative in the matter.17 
On page 363 of the Am. Bell opinion, which is pin cited by the 
McCormick Court, the Am. Bell Court continues: 
                                                
 15 Id. 
 16 128 U.S. 315 (1888). 
 17 Id. at 362–63 (emphasis added). 
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The patent, then, is not the exercise of any prerogative or 
discretion by the President or by any other officer of the 
government, but it is the result of a course of proceeding, 
quasi judicial in its character, and is not subject to be 
repealed or revoked by the President, the Secretary of 
Interior, or the Commissioner of Patents, when once 
issued.18 
Thus, although the Federal Government retained the 
constitutional authority to pursue the invalidation of patents 
fraudulently obtained—certainly a noble cause19—the Court made 
clear that, in pursuit of that noble cause, the Government’s 
recourse could only be found in the Article III courts, and not in 
the executive department which issued the patent. 
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. 
In United States v. Schurz,20 the Court was asked to consider 
whether the General Land Office could withhold delivery of a land 
patent once it was signed, sealed, and recorded by that office. In 
particular, the General Land Office identified, after patent 
recordation, evidence of “conflicting rights of other parties to the 
lands covered by it.”21 Although the Land Office controlled most 
aspects of the granting process (both ministerial and judicial), the 
Court held that, once granted, title to the land passed from the 
government, and only a court as a matter of constitutional principle 
had the authority to revoke the patent. Therefore, the Land Office 
could be compelled by writ to deliver the patent to the patentee 
(even where there was newly discovered evidence of “conflicting 
rights”). Specifically, the Court explained: 
The Constitution of the United States declares that 
Congress shall have power to dispose of and make needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory and other 
property belonging to the United States. Under this 
provision that sale of the public lands was placed by statute 
                                                
 18 Id. at 363 (emphasis added). 
 19 Compare, for example, the policy goals underlying the enactment of the 
modern post grant review statutes. 
 20 102 U.S. 378 (1880). 
 21 Id. at 395. 
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under the control of the Secretary of Interior. To aid him in 
the performance of this duty, a bureau was created, at the 
head of which is the Commissioner of the General Land-
Office . . . 
. . . This court has with a strong hand upheld the doctrine 
that so long as legal title to these lands remained in the 
United States, and the proceedings for acquiring it were yet 
in fieri, the courts would not interfere to control the 
exercise of the power thus vested in that tribunal. To that 
doctrine we still adhere. 
But we have also held that when, by the action of these 
officers and of the President of the United States, in issuing 
a patent to a citizen, the title to the lands has passed from 
the government, the question as to real ownership is open in 
the proper courts to all the considerations appropriate to 
the case. And this is so, whether the suit is by the United 
States to set aside the patent and recover back the title . . . 
or by an individual.22 
The Court further held that it was required to curtail the power of 
“a high officer of the executive branch” in order to avoid an 
“irremediable injustice.” In the Court’s words: 
It is not always that the ill consequences of a principle 
should control a court in deciding what the established law 
on a particular subject is, and in the delicate matter of 
controlling the action of a high officer of the executive 
branch of government, it would certainly not alone be 
sufficient to justify judicial interposition. But it may tend to 
reconcile us to such action as we feel forced to take, under 
settled doctrines of the courts, to see that any other course 
would lead to irremediable injustice.23 
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. 
The next sentence from McCormick, as well as the 
constitutional authority from which it is derived, is evaluated. 
                                                
 22 Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added). 
 23 Id. at 404 (emphasis added). 
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It has become the property of the patentee, and as such is 
entitled to the same legal protection as other property. 
Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516; Cammeyer v. Newton, 
94 U.S. 225, United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 271.24 
In United States v. Palmer, the owner of a patent for 
intellectual property claiming improvements in infantry equipment 
sued the Government for breach of implied license. In essence, the 
Government used the patented improvements and declined to pay 
the patent owner in contravention of an implied agreement 
between the parties. 
The Government objected to the lawsuit on jurisdictional 
grounds. The Court held that the Court of Claims (as opposed to 
the Circuit Court) had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute given that 
the alleged breach of implied license was a contract action, and not 
a tort. If either patent infringement or invalidity were at issue, then 
the Circuit Court would have exclusive jurisdiction. 
Interestingly, and perhaps troubled by the facts of the case, the 
Court did not stop there—although it could have relative to the 
jurisdictional arguments presented. Specifically, the Court 
confronted the antiquated English practice reserving to the Crown 
the right to use patented inventions: 
It was at one time somewhat doubted whether the 
government might not be entitled to the use and benefit of 
every patented invention, by analogy to the English law 
which reserves this right to the crown. But that notion no 
longer exists.25 
On page 271 of the Palmer opinion, which is pin cited by 
McCormick, the Court continued: 
The United States has no such prerogative as that which is 
claimed by the sovereigns of England, by which it can 
reserve to itself, either expressly or by implication, a 
superior dominion and use in that which it grants by letters-
patent to those who entitle themselves to such grants. The 
government of the United States, as well as the citizen, is 
                                                
 24 169 U.S. at 609. 
 25 128 U.S. at 270. 
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subject to the Constitution; and when it grants a patent the 
grantee is entitled to it as a matter of right, and does not 
receive it, as was originally supposed to be the case in 
England, as a matter of grace and favor.26 
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. 
In Seymour v. Osborne¸27 the Court held that in a dispute 
between parties for alleged patent infringement, reissued patents 
may be invalid where they claim an invention substantially 
different from what was originally claimed. In the Court’s view, 
any reissued patent granted by the Commissioner failing to comply 
with the Patent Office’s guidelines was invalid for want of 
statutory authority. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that only a court of equity could 
make determinations regarding reissued patent invalidity: 
Inventions secured by letters patent are property in the 
holder of the patent, and as such are as much entitled to 
protection as any other property . . . 28 
. . . Whether a reissued patent is for the same invention as 
that embodied in the original patent or for a different one is 
a question for the court in an equity suit to be determined 
as a matter of construction, on a comparison of the two 
instruments, aided or not by the testimony of expert 
witnesses, as it may or may not appear that one or both may 
contain technical terms or terms of art requiring such 
assistance in ascertaining the true meaning of the language 
employed.29 
Perhaps not as overt as the other cited authority, this, like 
McCormick, is nonetheless a constitutional holding. 
                                                
 26 Quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882) (emphasis added). 
James v. Campbell was recently discussed, and favorably applied, in a Supreme 
Court majority opinion. See Horne v. Dept. Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 
(2015). 
    27 78 U.S. 516 (1871). 
 28 Id. at 533. 
 29 Id. at 545–46 (emphasis added). 
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In Cammeyer v. Newton,30 a patent owner sued an employee of 
the Government for patent infringement. The Court found that 
patent infringement had not occurred, but, like the Palmer Court, 
took the decision a step further. Specifically, in the first paragraph 
of the opinion, the Court explained: 
Holders of valid letters-patent enjoy, by virtue of the same, 
the exclusive right and liberty of making and using the 
invention therein secured, and of vending the same to 
others to be used, as provided by the act of Congress; and 
the rule of law is well settled, that an invention so secured 
is property in the holder of the patent, and that as such the 
right of the holder is as much entitled to protection as any 
other property . . . 31 
The Court continued, perhaps troubled by the alleged infringement 
of privately-owned patents by members of the Government: 
Public employment is no defense to the employee for 
having converted the private property of another to the 
public use without his consent and without just 
compensation. Private property, the Constitution provides, 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; 
and it is clear that that provision is as applicable to the 
government as to individuals . . . 
. . . Agents of the public have no more right to take such 
private property than other individuals under that provision 
[of the Patent Act], as it contains no exception warranting 
any such invasion of the private rights of individuals.32 
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. 
The next sentence of McCormick is particularly important, and 
this statement has been quoted numerous times by parties 
challenging the constitutionality of the USPTO’s patent revocation 
power. 
                                                
30 94 U.S. at 226 (1876). 
 31 Id. at 226 (emphasis added). For additional discussion regarding intellectual 
property patents as constitutionally-protected private property, see generally 
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection 
of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007). 
 32 94 U.S. at 234–35 (emphasis added). 
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The only authority competent to set a patent aside, or to 
annul it, or to correct it for any reason whatever, is vested 
in the courts of the United States, and not in the department 
which issued the patent. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 
533, United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 
315, 364; Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 
589, 593. 
Moore v. Robbins33 is another highly important case, and 
perhaps belongs in the same pantheon as McCormick and Am. Bell. 
In Moore, a land patent was issued by the Commissioner of the 
General Land Office to “Party A.” “Party B” appealed from the 
decision of the Commissioner to the Secretary of the Interior, 
arguing that it (as opposed to Party A) was the rightful owner and 
thus entitled to the patent. The Secretary agreed, and directed the 
return of Party A’s patent to the Land Office. Party A refused, and 
litigation ensued. 
Significantly, the lower court agreed with Party B “on the 
ground that to the officers of the Land Department, including the 
Secretary of the Interior, the acts of Congress had confided the 
determination of this class of cases.”34 Stated differently, the lower 
court read the relevant statute as conferring adjudicatory authority 
to the Land Office. The Supreme Court’s response is critically 
important in terms of undermining the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of McCormick. The Court expressly declined to 
evaluate or review the relevant statute: 
Without now inquiring into the nature and extent of the 
doctrine referred to by the [lower] court . . . it is equally 
clear that when the patent has been awarded to one of the 
contestants, and has been issued, delivered, and accepted, 
all right to control the title or to decide on the right to the 
title has passed from the land office. Not only has it passed 
from the land office, but it has passed from the Executive 
Department of the government.35 
                                                
 33 96 U.S. 530 (1878). 
 34 Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 
 35 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the Supreme Court declined to evaluate the text of the 
statute, or whether the Land Office had been statutorily 
empowered to recall the patent. Instead, the Court held as a matter 
of constitutional principle that the right to recall title had “passed 
from the Executive Department.” This case underlies the 
McCormick holding, and the Federal Circuit’s view of it is in direct 
conflict. 
The McCormick Court pin cited page 533 of the Moore opinion 
for the proposition that patents for intellectual property may only 
be invalidated by an Article III court. There, the Moore Court 
continued in a similar vein: 
But in all of this there is no place for the further control of 
the Executive Department over the title. The functions of 
that department necessarily cease when the title has passed 
from the government. And the title does so pass in every 
instance where, under the decisions of the officers having 
authority in the matter, a conveyance, generally called a 
patent, has been signed by the President, and sealed, and 
delivered to and accepted by the grantee. It is a matter of 
course that, after this is done, neither the secretary nor any 
other executive officer can entertain an appeal. He is 
absolutely without authority. If this were not so, the titles 
derived from the United States, instead of being the safe 
and assured evidence of ownership which they are 
generally supposed to be, would be always subject to the 
fluctuating, and in many cases unreliable, action of the 
land office. No man could buy the grantee with safety, 
because he could only convey subject to the right of the 
officers of the government to annul his title. 
If such a power exists, when does it cease? There is no 
statute of limitations against the government; and if this 
right to reconsider and annul a patent after it has once 
become perfect exists in the Executive Department, it can 
be exercised at any time, however remote. It is needless to 
pursue the subject further. The existence of any such power 
in the Land Department is utterly inconsistent with the 
universal principle on which the right of private property is 
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founded . . . [Party A] has a title perfect both at law and in 
equity. (emphasis added).36 
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. And not only is 
it a constitutional holding, it is a constitutional holding made in the 
face of a question of statutory interpretation—a question of 
statutory interpretation the Court expressly declined to resolve in 
favor of addressing the overriding constitutional principles. 
United States v. Am. Bell is cited again by the McCormick 
Court, this time, however, pin citing page 364 as opposed to page 
363. Recall that the Am. Bell Court approved the Federal 
Government’s ability to unilaterally pursue the revocation of 
intellectual property patents obtained by fraud. The same Court 
was also careful to ensure that, although the Federal Government 
had the power to initiate revocation proceedings, those proceedings 
were required to take place in an Article III court. Specifically, the 
Court held on page 364 of American Bell that: 
The only authority competent to set a patent [for 
intellectual property] aside, or to annul it, or to correct it, 
for any reason whatever, is vested in the judicial 
department of government, and this can be effected by 
proper proceedings taken in the courts of the United 
States.37 
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. 
In Michigan Land v. Rust,38 the Supreme Court held that prior 
to the grant of a land patent, the General Land Office retained 
significant authority to review the validity of rights claimed against 
the Government. This case arose in the context of a dispute 
regarding the designation of property as swamp land. Per the 
statute, swamp land was to issue to the state; other land could be 
sold to private owners. The disputed land patent had originally 
been designated as swamp land; however, the General Land Office 
updated its designation before land patent issuance. The Court held 
that, prior to patent issuance, the executive department retained 
                                                
 36 Id. at 533 (emphasis added). 
 37 128 U.S. at 364. 
 38 168 U.S. 589 (1897). 
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significant discretion in the resolution of the right; however, once 
issued, only a court could determine patent validity. 
The McCormick Court pin cited page 593 of the Michigan 
Land decision. There, the Court explained: 
[W]henever the granting act specifically provides for the 
issue of a patent, then the rule is that the legal title remains 
in the Government until the issue of the patent; and while 
so remaining the grant is in process of administration, and 
the jurisdiction of the land department is not lost . . . In 
other words, the power of the department to inquire into the 
extent and validity of the rights claimed against the 
Government does not cease until the legal title has passed 
. . . After the issue of the patent the matter becomes subject 
to inquiry only in the courts and by judicial proceedings 
(emphasis added).39 
This, like McCormick, is a constitutional holding. 
The McCormick decision further rests on other formative 
separation of powers cases. Cases like United States v. Stone,40 
Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell,41 or Noble v. Union River 
Logging Railroad42 do not compel a different result. Suffice it to 
say that the Supreme Court in McCormick backed its opinion with 
virtually every landmark separation of powers case it had at its 
disposal. 
To agree that McCormick is statutorily-based requires the sort 
of suspension of disbelief better reserved for creative writing. The 
case law underlying the McCormick decision is unmistakably 
constitutional. In this regard, McCormick is not an esoteric and 
long-forgotten manifestation of aberrant Supreme Court decisional 
law, but instead the end result of decades of proactive separation of 
powers jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, securing for both land 
and intellectual property patent owners their day in an Article III 
court. 
                                                
 39 168 U.S. at 533 (citing Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530 (1878)). 
40 69 U.S. 525 (1865). 
41 135 U.S. 286 (1890). 
 42 147 U.S. 165 (1893). 
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In Patlex, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the constitutional 
holding of McCormick, and attempted to outmaneuver it with a 
mischaracterization of the Supreme Court’s public rights rule. In 
MCM, the Federal Circuit confronted McCormick, and reclassified 
it as a case of mere statutory interpretation.43 If anything is clear, it 
is that the Federal Circuit views McCormick as obsolete. This 
imperative, however, lies with the Supreme Court of the United 
States, not with the Federal Circuit. 
Further, calling into question the constitutional basis of the 
McCormick decision necessarily calls into question the 
constitutional basis of the many decisions upon which McCormick 
relies. This not only creates an improbable (impossible?) result, but 
also a dangerous one—if McCormick is a question of mere 
statutory authorization, is Palmer the same? What about Am. Bell, 
Moore v. Robbins, or James v. Campbell? These cases represent 
pillars on the separation of powers landscape, and the Federal 
Circuit’s precedential MCM decision directly challenges them. 
D. A Historical Review of Interference Proceedings Does Not 
Compel a Different Result 
It is argued that the Patent Act of 183644 conferred upon the 
Commissioner of Patents the power to invalidate issued patents for 
intellectual property during interference proceedings. It is true that 
§ 8 of that Act empowered the Commissioner to conduct 
interference proceedings where “an application shall be made for a 
patent which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere 
with any other patent for which an application may be pending, or 
with any unexpired patent,” and that § 8 of that Act further 
empowered the Commissioner to render a decision “on the 
question of priority of right or invention.”45 It is not true, however, 
that this provision conferred upon the Patent Office the patent 
invalidation power. 
                                                
 43 Perhaps an alternative argument, from the Federal Circuit’s perspective, is 
that McCormick was wrongly decided. 
 44 Patent Act of 1836, Pub. L. No. 24-357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 
 45 Id. § 8. 
MAY 2017] After MCM, a Second Look 19 
Specifically, where § 8 of the Act establishes the administrative 
review mechanism, § 16 of the same Act specifies the enforcement 
procedure governing the § 8 administrative determination:46 
And it be further enacted, That whenever there shall be two 
interfering patents, or whenever a patent on application 
shall have been refused on an adverse decision of a board 
of examiners . . . any person interested in any such patent 
. . . may have remedy by bill in equity; and the court having 
cognizance thereof . . . may adjudge and declare the either 
the patents void in whole or in part, or inoperative or 
invalid . . . (emphasis added).47 
Per the statute, the patent invalidation power remained in the 
Article III courts, and any reliance upon the 1836 Act for the 
proposition that administrative patent invalidation was a mainstay 
of the United States patent system is misplaced.  
As patent academic Professor Mark Lemley48 identified in his 
detailed review of the history of patent disputes in the United 
States and England, the effect of interference proceedings under 
the 1836 Act was two-fold: 
The 1836 Patent Act did not include a specific private 
cause of action for scire facias cancellation for fraud or 
equitable conduct, but only in the case of what we would 
today call an interference proceeding between competing 
inventors. As a result, revocation proceedings that would 
actually declare a patent invalid and therefore void all but 
disappeared from U.S. law after 1836.49 
And more importantly, from the standpoint of Article III: 
                                                
 46 In this regard, the procedure was (presciently) in harmony with Crowell and 
Schor, discussed infra. 
 47 Patent Act of 1836 § 16. 
 48 Lemley, Why do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid? 99 VA. L. REV. 1673 
(2013). In this article, Professor Lemley provides a comprehensive review of the 
history of the American and English patent systems. The purpose of the review 
is to support the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial 
does not accompany a “pure” claim of patent invalidity. Although his article 
addresses the Seventh Amendment, the historical review is equally applicable in 
other contexts—e.g., Article III. 
 49 Id. at 1699 (emphasis added). 
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A closer analogy to the revocation proceeding was the sole 
provision in the 1836 Act for private scire facias, which 
was available only in the case of disagreement between two 
patentees over which one was the true inventor . . . 
Notably, the Supreme Court held that a proceeding of this 
sort was a proceeding in equity, not law . . . [and] ‘the 
nature of the chancery jurisdiction and its mode of 
proceeding have established it as the appropriate tribunal 
for the annulling of a grant or patent from the 
government.’50 
Thus, not only did revocation proceedings “all but disappear[]” 
after enactment of the statute, the limited revocation proceedings 
that did occur (regarding issued patents) took place in Article III 
courts. 
The Federal Circuit correctly identified in MCM the first 
instance of the USPTO receiving the patent invalidation power 
from Congress:51 
McCormick [] did not address Article III and certainly did 
not forbid Congress from granting the PTO the authority to 
correct or cancel an issued patent. Congress has since done 
so by creating the ex parte reexamination proceeding in 
1980; the inter partes reexamination proceeding in 1990; 
and inter partes review, post-grant review, and Covered 
Business Method patent review in 2011.52 
It appears that the USPTO’s interference proceedings were 
first empowered to invalidate issued patents by a November 8, 
1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (pre-AIA).53 This date is 
generally aligned with the enactment of the reexamination statute 
(1980), and pre-dates the Federal Circuit’s Patlex decision by 
several months. 
                                                
 50 Id. at 1700 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 51 Beyond the question of the Patent Office’s constitutional adjudicatory 
authority certified for the Supreme Court in McCormick. 
 52 912 F.3d at 1289 (emphasis added). 
 53 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. 135 (Pre-AIA): Interferences, BITLAW (Nov. 2015),  
http://www.bitlaw.com/source/35usc/135_(pre%E2%80%91AIA).html. 
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It is further argued that two 19th century Supreme Court cases 
support the conclusion that the Supreme Court contemplated the 
Article I Patent Office’s patent invalidation power without 
objection (constitutional or otherwise), thus confirming that 
McCormick was decided on statutory grounds. In particular, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Duell54 post-dates the 
McCormick decision by ten months, and thus, the reasoning goes, 
if McCormick was decided on constitutional grounds, it certainly 
would have featured in Duell, which did not cite or otherwise 
discuss McCormick. 
At issue in Duell was whether a patent would issue (pending 
resolution of the interference) from competing applications.55 The 
broader question was whether Congress could assign Article III 
review over pre-grant determinations made by the Patent Office.56 
Specifically, the Petitioner argued that the statute conferring 
Article III review over the executive determination was an 
unconstitutional usurpation of the executive’s power. 
Citing Murray’s Lessee, the Supreme Court disagreed.57 Given 
that the pre-grant phase of patent issuance implicates “public 
rights,” “Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of 
the courts [such rights] . . . as it deems proper.”58 Therefore, the 
statute providing for Article III review of the Commissioner’s 
determination of priority between competing patent applications 
did not threaten the separation of powers. Article III review was 
completely discretionary per Congress.59 
Duell did not feature the invalidation of an issued patent by the 
Commissioner, nor did it include evidence that the Court was 
                                                
 54 172 U.S. 576 (1899). 
 55 Id. at 583, 586–87. 
 56 Id. at 582. 
 57 Id. at 582–83. 
 58 Id. at 583. 
 59 In light of the Federal Circuit’s Patlex, Joy, and MCM decisions, the same 
reasoning necessarily applies to issued patents. See also Greenspoon, Paternal 
Justice: A Bill Cosby Approach to Patents by the PTO, IP WATCHDOG (July 12, 
2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/12/paternal-justice-bill-cosby-
approach-to-patents-by-the-pto/id=59620/. 
22 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 18: 1 
aware that the Commissioner had such alleged power.60 The fact 
that the Court reviewed the Patent Office’s ability to deny 
applications (whether during interference proceedings or 
otherwise) without objection is in harmony with the constitutional 
holding of McCormick, in addition to the various constitutional 
decisions from which it is derived. The pre-grant phase of both 
land and intellectual property patents is both ministerial and 
judicial, and implicates “public rights.” Once granted, however, 
title passes from the government, the patent vests as private 
property, and its validity becomes a matter of “private rights” 
requiring Article III resolution. Duell does not deviate from this 
constitutional scheme. 
Similarly, Morgan v. Daniels61 did not address (or even 
acknowledge) the Article I invalidation of an issued patent by the 
Commissioner during an interference proceeding. Instead, at issue 
in Morgan were competing patent applications.62 The Court held 
that the Commissioner’s factual determinations resolving the 
question of priority between the competing applications were 
treated as controlling (unless contrary testimony was rendered) in 
subsequent litigation.63 Morgan, thus, like Duell, is in sync with 
McCormick’s constitutional holding. 
Finally, to the extent the USPTO revoked issued patents during 
interference proceedings, no evidence has been presented that the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of such 
proceedings, or that it was even aware that the Patent Office had 
such alleged power. The power of the Patent Office to decline 
patent applications has never been in dispute—and in this vein, 
Duell and Morgan produce unremarkable results. 
Absent authority demonstrating that the Supreme Court 
expressly contemplated the constitutionality of interference 
proceedings revoking issued patents—or, conversely, that the 
Supreme Court resolved a case featuring an issued patent 
invalidated by the Commissioner during an interference without 
                                                
 60 See generally id. 
 61 153 U.S. 120 (1894). 
 62 See generally id. 
 63 Id. at 125. 
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constitutional complaint—reference to interference proceedings 
does not call into question the constitutional holding of 
McCormick. 
II. LITIGANTS AND LOWER COURTS MISCHARACTERIZE THE 
SUPREME COURT’S PUBLIC RIGHTS RULE OF LAW 
It is argued that even if McCormick was decided on 
constitutional grounds, no court should apply it as it is in conflict 
with modern administrative law. It is further argued, somewhat 
conveniently, that the Court’s public rights rule of law is an 
unknowable morass, devoid of identifiable parts. To be sure, the 
Court’s public rights precedent is hardly a model of clarity. 
However, where the Court’s opinions tend to get “bogged down” is 
not in the initial private right versus public right determination 
(particularly where a claim has centuries of historical antecedent at 
law or equity), but in defining the scope of permissible Article I 
involvement once the private right–public right question has been 
resolved. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the Court 
appears to have a somewhat different approach depending upon 
whether an administrative tribunal (e.g., the PTAB) or a legislative 
court (e.g., the bankruptcy court) is at issue. 
In order to understand the private right versus public right 
determination, it is necessary to understand the Supreme Court 
case that created it—i.e., Murray’s Lessee.64 Stunningly, in its first 
two decisions determining whether the validity of an issued patent 
is a matter of private or public rights, the Federal Circuit in Patlex 
and Joy neither acknowledged the controlling standard of Murray, 
nor even cited to it. No Supreme Court public rights majority, 
concurring, or plurality decision has criticized, diminished, or 
otherwise declined to apply Murray to the initial private right 
versus public right determination. Even the dissent in Stern v. 
Marshall applied the Murray rule without objection.65 The “fight” 
                                                
 64 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 
(1856). 
 65 Stern, 564 U.S. at 507–08 (J. Breyer observing, in dissent, that “[t]he 
majority reads the first part of the statement’s first sentence [of Murray] as 
authoritatively defining the boundaries of Article III” (emphasis in original)). 
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isn’t over whether Murray should or should not apply, the fight is 
over how important the private right–public right designation 
should be. And, per the Stern majority, that designation remains 
very important.66 In this regard, the Federal Circuit’s Patlex and 
Joy opinions stand uniquely alone. 
At least in MCM, the Federal Circuit acknowledged Murray.67 
However, the Federal Circuit again declined to apply, or even 
recite, the Murray standard. As the review below will demonstrate, 
the reason for this is clear—applying Murray (like McCormick) 
compels a finding of unconstitutionality. 
A. The Public Rights Exception: Murray’s Lessee 
The definitional complexity of the Supreme Court’s public 
rights jurisprudence is well known. The fundamental rationale of 
Murray, however, is relatively straightforward: how and where the 
nation, newly freed from English oppression, determined to resolve 
its disputes constitutes the core of the Article III judicial power.68 If 
the nation, during the pendency and eventual ratification of the 
U.S. Constitution, provided for the resolution of disputes between 
private citizens in a court of law, equity, or admiralty, then the 
issue is a matter of “private rights” requiring Article III 
resolution.69 Conversely, if the claims (1) were administratively 
resolved during this period, or (2) constitute novel statutory causes 
of action70 post-dating the ratification of the Constitution, then they 
are “public rights,” and may be resolved conclusively by an Article 
I tribunal. 
Statutory causes of action or affirmative defenses derived from 
power conferred by the U.S. Constitution may nonetheless be 
private rights, depending upon where these matters were 
resolved.71 Importantly, the public rights question compares how 
                                                
 66 Id. at 465. 
 67 812 F.3d at 1289. 
 68 59 U.S. at 281–82. 
 69 Somewhat perplexingly, litigants argue that this principle only applies to 
determinations at law, to the exclusion of equity or admiralty (perhaps 
conflating Seventh Amendment review with the public rights analysis). 
 70 Such “seemingly” private rights are nonetheless public rights. 
 71 59 U.S. at 280–85. 
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the colonies resolved their disputes (under English supervision) 
with how the newly formed nation determined the same. Where, as 
in the case of patent invalidity, there was a shift from legislative 
adjudication (colonies) to resolution at law or equity (nation), the 
right is necessarily private—the rationale being that the newly 
formed nation preferred (as the result of negative experiences) to 
have the dispute resolved in a court free from the influence of the 
executive.72 The public rights exception also looks to English 
practice, but not to the exclusion of the historical American 
practice.73 To the extent that the two practices are in harmony, the 
private right designation is further supported.74 
The facts of Murray demonstrate how this works in practice. In 
Murray, a tax collector failed to return the full sum due to the 
Treasury; the Solicitor of the Treasury, pursuant to his statutory 
authority, then issued a distress warrant against the collector, 
compelling the sale of various assets in satisfaction of the 
outstanding balance due.75 This process unfolded administratively. 
It was argued that this administrative process was a deprivation 
of due process, in addition to an unconstitutional exercise of the 
Article III judicial power.76 In resolving the question regarding the 
judicial power, the Court conceded that the process of auditing the 
collector was a “judicial act.”77 But was it a judicial act requiring 
an Article III court? The Court said no.78 Although it was a process 
susceptible to Article III resolution, it was not required because: 
[T]he means provided by the act of 1820 [for collection] do 
not differ in principle from those employed in England 
from remote antiquity—and in many of the States, so far as 
                                                
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Consider, for example, that the last reported use of the English Privy 
Council to invalidate an intellectual property patent was in 1779. Lemley, supra 
note 48, at 1684. By this stage, virtually all English patent invalidity disputes 
were resolved in the courts of law or equity. Id. at 1683–84. 
 75 59 U.S. at 274–75. 
 76 Id. at 275. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 280. 
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we know without objection—for this purpose, at the time 
the Constitution was formed.79 
That is, in both the United States and England, the matter was 
resolved administratively without objection, and therefore 
Congress retained discretion as to whether to invite the judiciary’s 
participation. This is the public rights rule, and this is how it is 
applied. The Supreme Court articulated it in the following (now 
famous) form: 
[W]e think it proper to state that we do not consider 
congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the 
common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . At the same 
time there are matters, involving public rights which may 
be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable 
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial 
determination, but which congress may or may not bring 
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as 
it may deem proper.80 
As indicated, the phrase “any matter which, from its nature, is 
the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty” 
did not appear in the three Federal Circuit opinions holding that 
the validity of an issued patent for intellectual property is a matter 
of public rights.81 Additionally, the Federal Circuit did not evaluate 
where the new nation resolved its patent disputes, or compare 
                                                
 79 Id. at 281–82 (emphasis added). The due process analysis required a similar 
review, comparing English practice with U.S. practice after independence had 
been achieved: “[W]e must look to those settled usages and modes of 
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the 
emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to 
their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the 
settlement of this country.” Murray, 59 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). 
 80 Id. at 284. Restrictive permutations of this standard, e.g., Federal 
Government as a party, have not survived the test of time. In this regard, the 
Court cautioned against doctrinaire reliance upon formal categories, but not to 
the exclusion of the law, equity, or admiralty rule. See, e.g., Crowell, 285 U.S. at 
53. 
 81 As discussed infra, a permutation of this standard appears in Judge Nies’ 
Lockwood dissent. 
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where the colonies were required to do the same.82 Similarly, there 
is no mention of customary English practice regarding patent 
disputes at or around the time of the Constitution’s ratification. As 
mentioned, no decision of the Supreme Court has omitted this rule, 
including the 2011 Stern v. Marshall majority and dissent.83 
Fortunately, this historical review was completed by the 
Federal Circuit in a separate context. The question of whether there 
is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on a “pure” question 
of patent invalidity requires a historical analysis to determine, in 
large part, whether a writ of scire facias for patent invalidity (as 
opposed to fraud) was resolved at law or equity. This is a complex 
question, and it is not addressed here.84 What is important from the 
standpoint of Article III is that the writ (and patent invalidity 
generally, even as an affirmative defense) was at one or the 
other—that is, whether at law or equity, the Article III result is 
necessarily the same. Suits at law, equity, or admiralty are private 
rights per Murray.85 
B. The Historical Narrative: Federal Circuit Case Law 
In In re Lockwood, the Federal Circuit determined that a “pure” 
question of patent invalidity had a Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial.86 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Petitioner 
withdrew its jury trial demand, and Lockwood was vacated.87 
                                                
 82 The determination does not turn on whether the matter is statutorily based. 
If this were the case, the statutory right at issue in Murray would have produced 
a one sentence opinion (with respect to Article III). Instead, the analysis 
determines where the statutory right was adjudicated. 
 83 See generally 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
 84 Compare, e.g., In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995) with Lemley, 
supra note 48. 
 85 Perhaps stated differently, because the Federal Circuit declined to perform 
the historical analysis required by Murray and Stern in Patlex, Joy, and MCM, 
the historical analysis completed by the same Court in a separate context 
(Seventh Amendment) is thus “borrowed”—historical facts are historical facts, 
and may be applied in parallel contexts (i.e., Seventh Amendment and Article 
III). 
 86 50 F.3d 966, 976 (1995). 
 87 See, e.g., Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., 257 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
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Follow-on decisions by the Federal Circuit have cited Lockwood 
favorably.88 Nonetheless, Lockwood is not important for the legal 
conclusion that it draws regarding the Seventh Amendment, but for 
the history that it tells. And whether vacated or not, historical facts 
remain historical facts. 
In determining that a pure question of patent validity had a 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial,89 the Federal Circuit 
looked beyond the Declaratory Judgment Act itself, and instead 
reviewed the adjudication of patent invalidity generally.90 Because 
patent invalidity was often raised as an affirmative defense to 
patent infringement, the Federal Circuit applied the inversion 
method—that is, “[i]f the declaratory judgment action does not fit 
into one of the existing equitable patterns but is essentially an 
inverted lawsuit—an action brought by one who would have been 
a defendant at common law—then the parties have a right to a 
jury.”91 Thus, the satisfactory “analog” was a suit for patent 
infringement (at law) where the affirmative defense of invalidity 
had been pled.92 By this rationale, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that a jury trial right attached.93 
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit also addressed the writ of 
scire facias.94 The Federal Circuit reasoned that because the writ 
was primarily used to invalidate patents obtained by fraud, it was 
more analogous to a claim of inequitable conduct than patent 
invalidity. And even if the writ was used to invalidate a patent in a 
“pure” sense, the Federal Circuit held that the equity court 
exercised both legal and equitable powers, and “[t]hus, in a scire 
facias raising genuine issues of material fact, the proceeding in 
chancery [i.e., equity] was suspended pending a determination by a 
                                                
 88 See, e.g., In re Tech. Licensing, 423 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Tegal 
Corp., 257 F.3d 1331. 
 89 In Lockwood, the complaint for patent infringement was dismissed; the 
declaration of patent invalidity remained in the dispute. 530 F.3d at 968–69. 
 90 Id. at 973–76. 
 91 Id. at 975 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92 Id. at 973–76. 
 93 Id. at 980. 
 94 Id. at 975. 
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jury summoned in the Court of King’s Bench, the main [common] 
law court.”95 
Applying this analysis to Article III and Murray, patent 
invalidity, either as an affirmative defense or as a standalone claim 
under a writ, was resolved at law or equity. Therefore, it is 
necessarily a private right, and no decision of the Supreme Court 
has held to the contrary. 
C. Judge Nies’ Lockwood Dissent: Important for What It Says, but 
Also for What It Doesn’t 
In her dissent, Judge Nies conceded that a jury trial right 
necessarily attached to a suit for damages for infringement.96 
However, she distinguished the infringement suit scenario, 
explaining “[a] separate nullification action, similar to the present 
day declaratory judgment action, could be brought before the 
English equity court. In England, prior to 1791, anyone could 
challenge a patent’s validity by a scire facias writ in equity.”97 
Such writs were not merely limited to fraud, which she connected, 
like the majority, to inequitable conduct, but also included 
“unlawful grant,” i.e. patent invalidity.98 Given that these writs 
were resolved at equity, as opposed to law, Judge Nies concluded 
that the jury trial right did not attach.99 
More importantly, Judge Nies correctly identified that the 
majority’s reasoning necessarily triggered a separation of powers 
problem under Murray.100 That is, by concluding that patent 
invalidity was resolved in American and English courts of law at 
or near the time of the Constitution’s ratification, “Patlex must be 
overruled under the panel’s reasoning.”101 Per Judge Nies, “[a] 
                                                
 95 Lockwood, 530 F.3d at 975. 
 96 Id. at 981. 
 97 Id. at 984 (emphasis added). 
 98 Id. at 985. 
 99 Id. at 981–85. 
 100 Id. at 983. 
 101 Lockwood, 530 F.3d at 982. 
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litigant cannot have a constitutional right and not have a 
constitutional right on the same issue.”102 
Judge Nies then articulated the Murray standard, as she viewed 
it. It is reproduced below exactly as it is written in the dissent: 
Congress can [not] withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the 
common law . . . At the same time there are matters, 
involving public rights, which may be presented in such 
form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, 
and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but 
which congress may or may not bring within the 
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may 
deem proper.103 
Applying her rendition of Murray, Judge Nies concluded that 
because the writ was traditionally resolved at equity, not only was 
the Seventh Amendment inapplicable, but the claim also remained 
a “public right.”104 Therefore, in Judge Nies’ view, Patlex remained 
good law. 
The standard reproduced by Judge Nies, however, is not the 
Murray rule. Compare with the complete language of Murray, as 
written by the Supreme Court:105 
Congress can [not] withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the 
common law, or in equity, or admiralty . . . At the same 
time there are matters, involving public rights which may 
                                                
 102 Id. Interestingly, Judge Newman, the author of Patlex, also dissented in In 
re Tech. Licensing, where she provided a passionate defense of the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial on “pure” questions of patent invalidity. 
Specifically, Judge Newman argued “[p]atent validity was a common law action 
tried to a jury in Eighteenth Century England. An action to repeal and cancel a 
patent was pled as the common law writ of scire facias . . . [t]his was the 
situation in 1791 in England, and the United States Constitution preserved that 
[jury trial] right.” 423 F.3d at 1292–94. 
 103 Id. at 982 (emphasis added). 
 104 Id. at 981–85. 
 105 Compare further with, for example, the language of Article III, § 2: “The 
Judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in law or equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States . . . ” (emphasis added). 
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be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable 
of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial 
determination, but which congress may or may not bring 
within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as 
it may deem proper.106 
Applying the Supreme Court’s standard to Judge Nies’ 
conclusion that the invalidity writ was resolved at equity, patent 
invalidity is thus a “private right” (without a jury trial right) 
requiring Article III resolution. That the Court’s standard was 
excised in this fashion is inexplicable. Presumably, Judge Nies 
sought to preserve Patlex while simultaneously circumventing the 
Seventh Amendment—a result unsupported, however, by the rule 
of law. 
D. The Historical Narrative: Patent Scholarship 
The patent scholarship tells a similar tale. As Professor Lemley 
explains: 
[M]ost patents in the colonies were grants of government 
privilege over land or markets, not patents for invention . . . 
I can find no report of colonial patent lawsuits or 
revocation proceedings before the American Revolution. 
Instead, if a party wanted a legislative patent grant revoked, 
they petitioned the legislature to do so.107 
After the American Revolution, however, this practice changed, 
and the courts became the sole venue for patent invalidation.108 Per 
Professor Lemley: 
The first federal patent statute was enacted in 1790 . . . The 
Act provided that any party could petition a court to cancel 
a patent, but only for fraud or what we would describe 
today as inequitable conduct . . . Section 6 of the Act 
provided that a defendant suing for infringement could 
raise a challenge [in court] to the adequacy of the patent 
specification . . . 109 
                                                
 106 Murray, 59 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added). 
 107 Lemley, supra note 48, at 1692 (emphasis added). 
 108 Id. at 1693. 
 109 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Importantly, in the one recorded instance where a party sought 
to revoke a patent legislatively, the Congressional committee 
declined to do so, and instead referred the invalidity question to the 
courts: 
[I]n the one reported instance of an effort to revoke a 1790 
Act patent, the complainant didn’t go to court at all, in law 
or in equity. Instead, following the colonial practice, he 
went to Congress, which appointed a committee in 1794 to 
consider whether to revoke the patent as improvidently 
granted. The committee in turn referred the matter to the 
courts for adjudication.110 
From there, American patent practice evolved quickly: 
[Under the 1793 Act,] the United States operated a 
registration system, under which anyone who filed a patent 
application was entitled to a patent, the validity of which 
was tested (if at all) in the courts. After 1800, federal 
subject matter jurisdiction was exclusive; patentees could 
no longer sue in state court . . . the 1790 and 1793 Acts 
provided federal subject matter jurisdiction only in law, and 
not in equity, courts. It wasn’t until 1819 that Congress 
enacted federal subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases 
in equity.111 
The parallel English practice did not diverge meaningfully. By 
the time of the U.S. Constitution, Privy Council usage, though 
technically still permissible, had fallen into disuse: 
The Privy Council was the primary means for revoking 
patents until as late as 1753 . . . [but] once the courts had 
the power to adjudge patent validity, the Privy Council 
largely got out of the business of doing so; it last revoked a 
patent in 1779 . . . 112 
Instead, the predominant practice was, in relevant part: 
The only way to actually invalidate a patent in the modern 
sense of the word was to bring a scire facias action for 
                                                
 110 Id. at 1693–94 (emphasis added). 
 111 Id. at 1694 (emphasis added). 
 112 Id. at 1682–84 (emphasis added). 
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revocation. And it was the Chancellor, not the jury, who 
held the final power to revoke a patent using scire facias. 
The fact that scire facias was a common law proceeding 
conducted in the first instance of an equity court meant that 
the distinction between legal and factual issues was more 
important than in the law courts. While chancery courts 
could and did refer validity questions to juries at common 
law, they did so only when there was a disputed issue of 
fact that was necessary to the resolution of the validity 
issue.113 
Thus, both the American and English systems resolved their 
invalidity disputes (whether as affirmative defenses or as 
standalone claims) in the courts of law and equity. The colonists, 
conversely, received legislative rights that were legislatively 
revoked—a practice the new nation assertively abandoned in its 
first days.114 And although very early on patent matters could be 
resolved in state courts as well as federal courts, by 1800 the 
federal courts of law had exclusive jurisdiction.115 This fact, in 
conjunction with the predominant English practice by the end of 
the 18th Century, demonstrates that the post-issuance patent 
invalidation power belongs to the Article III courts. 
E. A Brief Review of the Supreme Court’s Public Rights Case Law 
In McCormick, the Court held—relying on a bevy of 
constitutional separation of powers cases—that an issued patent 
may only be set aside by an Article III court.116 Patent invalidity, 
whether as an affirmative defense or a standalone writ, has 
centuries of historical antecedent both at law and equity.117 Further, 
although patent matters were resolved legislatively by the colonies, 
the new nation proactively determined to resolve its patent matters 
in the courts of law and equity.118 This brings patent invalidity, to 
the extent that McCormick didn’t already answer the question, into 
                                                
 113 Id. at 1687 (emphasis added). 
 114 Id. at 1692–94. 
 115 Id. at 1682–84. 
 116 See generally 169 U.S. 606 (1898). 
 117 See generally In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966; Lemley, supra note 48, 
 118 Lemley, supra note 48, at 1692–94. 
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the core of the Article III judicial power per Murray (and, more 
recently, Stern). 
Where the issue becomes complicated is in the resolution of 
“what comes next?” That is, if it is a private right, what level of 
Article I participation is permissible under the administrative 
tribunal and legislative court scenarios? Importantly, whether a 
case deals with an administrative tribunal or a legislative court, the 
private right versus public right determination is the same.119 
Different factors apply, however, once that determination has been 
made—and those factors aren’t always clear, or even consistent.120 
The USPTO’s courts are administrative tribunals. Where 
administrative tribunals adjudicate matters of private rights (i.e., 
issued patent invalidity), Crowell and Schor are the applicable 
cases.121 Thus, in order for private right adjudication to be 
constitutional in an administrative tribunal setting, that 
adjudication must comport with the requirements of both of those 
cases.122 
In Crowell, the Court was asked to consider whether an 
administrative tribunal may adjudicate private right (in this case, 
admiralty) claims without violating Article III of the 
Constitution.123 The Court held that it could, provided that the 
administrative tribunal and the Article III district courts were 
correctly aligned.124 Specifically: 
                                                
 119 Compare, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (administrative 
tribunal) with Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) (legislative court). 
 120 Many of these factors have been inappropriately applied to the private right 
versus public right question; in most instances, they supplant the Murray 
analysis altogether. The result, of course, is a loophole, not a safeguard. 
 121 For a comprehensive review of the Court’s public rights cases, see 
generally Rothwell, supra note 1. 
 122 Conversely, if patent invalidity is a public right, then there is nothing 
constitutionally infirm with the current arrangement (e.g., the PTAB). In fact, 
Article III supervision of Article I patent invalidation will continue for only as 
long as the executive and legislative branches deem it prudent. 
 123 See generally Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 124 Id. at 48–65. 
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1) Although the administrative orders were “final,” 
enforcement in the event of default required a federal 
district court.125 
2) Upon commencement of enforcement proceedings, the 
district court retained authority to review (a) legal issues 
and (b) fundamental (e.g., jurisdictional) facts de novo; 
other facts were reviewed under the substantial evidence 
standard.126 
3) The administrative order was only enforceable by a writ 
of execution entered by the district court. But for this writ, 
the administrative order had no legal effect.127 
Given that the district court retained the enforcement power, in 
addition to de novo review authority over questions of law, “[t]here 
is thus no attempt to interfere with, but rather provision is made to 
facilitate, the exercise by the court of its jurisdiction . . . “128 The 
Court cautioned, however: 
The recognition of the utility and convenience of 
administrative agencies for the investigation and finding of 
facts . . . does not require the conclusion that there is no 
limitation on their use, and that the Congress could 
completely oust the [district] courts of all determinations of 
fact by vesting the authority to make them in their own 
instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That 
would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the 
Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a 
bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever 
fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do 
depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in 
effect finality in law.129 
Schor130 does not deviate meaningfully from this arrangement. 
Specifically, at issue in Schor was a private right common law 
                                                
 125 Id. at 44. 
 126 See id. at 44, 54–55. 
 127 Id. at 44. 
 128 285 U.S. at 49. 
 129 Id. at 56–57 (emphasis added). 
 130 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
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claim131 before an Article I administrative tribunal. Because the 
administrative orders were only enforceable by a federal district 
court, where questions of law were reviewed de novo, and 
questions of fact were reviewed for substantial evidence, private 
right resolution by the administrative tribunal was not 
unconstitutional: 
The [administrative] orders, like those of the agency in 
Crowell but unlike those of the [legislative] bankruptcy 
courts under the [unconstitutional] 1978 Act, are 
enforceable only by order of the district court. The 
[administrative] orders are also reviewed under the same 
‘weight of the evidence’132 standard sustained in Crowell, 
rather than the more deferential standard found lacking in 
Northern Pipeline. The legal rulings of the [administrative 
tribunal], like the legal determinations of the agency in 
Crowell, are subject to de novo review.133 
In addition to the strict structural requirement defining the 
necessary constitutional interrelationship between the federal 
district courts and the administrative tribunal, the Schor Court 
identified other criteria.134 For example, the consent of the parties, 
as well as the Congressional purpose, were important 
considerations.135 
The introduction of “congressional purpose”136 further serves to 
safeguard the separation of powers. A purely structural limitation 
(i.e., district court enforcement with de novo–substantial evidence 
review) serves as a potential blueprint for the expansion of federal 
power. Fact-finding is a critically important element in the 
resolution of any dispute, and the substantial evidence standard 
confers significant deference to administrative tribunals. Therefore, 
                                                
 131 See id. at 853–54 for Schor’s favorable review (and application) of the 
Murray standard. 
 132 Issues of how weight of the evidence might differ from substantial 
evidence, or whether de novo review should apply to “fundamental” factual 
determinations in light of McCormick, are beyond the scope of this article. 
 133 478 U.S. at 853 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 134 See generally 478 U.S. 833. 
 135 See, e.g., id. at 855. 
 136 And related factors, for example, “regulatory scheme.” 478 U.S. at 855. 
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the Schor factors dissuade the proliferation of administrative 
tribunals as a matter of mere structural convenience—that is, if 
Congress seeks to delegate the fact-finding function to an adjunct 
of the federal district courts, it is required to have a valid 
“purpose” for doing so beyond the aggrandizement of federal 
power. 
Thus, the Schor factors (as the opinion itself indicates) do not 
supplant the Murray rule, or otherwise call into question the 
structural blueprint established by Crowell. Instead, they introduce 
a second layer of review, ensuring that Congress acts for a valid 
public purpose when it creates a new (adjunct) administrative 
tribunal. 
F. Unconstitutionality of Article I Patent Revocation, and How to 
Correct 
Applying Murray, McCormick, Am. Bell, Moore v. Robbins, 
and Stern, the validity of an issued patent for intellectual property 
is a private right. If this conclusion is incorrect, then the structural 
and policy considerations of Crowell and Schor drop from the 
analysis, and, as a public right, Congress is more or less free to do 
with it as it pleases. If the private right conclusion is correct, then 
the USPTO’s current post-grant patent revocation scheme is 
unconstitutional. 
In light of the structural principles articulated in Crowell and 
Schor, the reasons for this should be clear. Specifically: 
1) But for an appeal from the USPTO’s patent revocation 
(whether by reexamination, inter partes review, etc.), 
the patent is cancelled by the USPTO either in whole or 
in part. Federal district court enforcement is not 
required. 
2) Where a party appeals a determination of patent 
invalidity by the USPTO, the Federal Circuit, and not 
the federal district courts, entertains the appeal. 
The structural fix is straightforward. USPTO patent invalidity 
determinations are recalibrated so as to receive federal district 
court enforcement, where questions of law are reviewed de novo, 
and questions of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. 
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It is argued that Article III appellate review satisfies the 
structural limitations identified in Crowell and Schor. No decision 
of the Supreme Court has said this, and in this regard Crowell and 
Schor speak for themselves. Further, in the context of a legislative 
court, both the Northern Pipeline plurality and concurrence137 held 
(constituting a majority) that Article III appellate review does not 
remedy the constitutional harm where legislative courts adjudicate 
private rights.138 
If the USPTO’s post-grant revocation proceedings are 
recalibrated as adjuncts to the federal district courts, is the 
“congressional purpose” aspect of Schor satisfied? The answer to 
this question is almost undoubtedly yes. The Supreme Court’s 
Cuozzo decision,139 largely devoted to addressing questions of 
statutory interpretation, is replete with references to “congressional 
objective,” “statutory scheme,” “Congress[ional] purpose,” and the 
like.140 It is thus inconceivable that the Court would find this 
element of Schor unmet.  
III. THE STAKES COULDN’T BE HIGHER 
Without question, recalibrating the various USPTO 
administrative tribunals as adjuncts to the federal district courts 
would represent a seismic shift in the nation’s patent system. The 
importance of inter partes review in patent litigation would likely 
                                                
 137 See generally Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline 
Co., 458 U.S 50 (1982). 
 138 The Supreme Court recently evaluated the “basic principles of institutional 
capacity,” holding that district court review of administrative determinations of 
“multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts . . . are well suited to a district court 
judge’s expertise.” Conversely, “neat set[s] of legal rules” might be more 
amendable to appellate review. McLane Co., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 137 S. Ct. 1159 
(2017). Compare this with, for example, the factual inquiries typically 
conducted during a § 103 obviousness determination: the scope and content of 
the prior art; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; the level 
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; and objective indicia of 
non-obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 139 See generally Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 140 See also Supreme Court Affirms Cuozzo—Siding with Patent Office on BRI 
and No-Appeal, PATENTLY-O (June 20, 2016), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/06/supreme-affirms-office.html. 
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drop, and patent issues would appear on federal district court 
dockets with greater frequency. Third party entities that developed 
business models around the PTAB’s lack of standing requirement 
would also have to recalibrate. Patent litigation, in terms of its raw 
numbers, would likely rebound. 
It is untrue, however, that re-designating patent invalidity as a 
private right per Murray and Stern would cause large swaths of the 
administrative state to fracture. Arguments of this variety amount 
to fearmongering, and a decision applying Murray concluding that 
patent invalidity was resolved in American and English courts of 
law and equity would not cause the administrative state to fracture 
any more than Stern caused the administrative state to fracture, any 
more than Granfinanciera141 caused the administrative state to 
fracture, any more than Schor caused the administrative state to 
fracture, and so forth. 
This is weighed against the current and potential future harm 
caused by leaving the public rights designation unchanged. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Stern, public rights are administrative 
claims that “[C]ongress may or may not bring within the 
cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem 
proper,”142 and as Judge Nies explained in her Lockwood dissent, 
“Congress could place the issue of [patent] validity entirely in the 
hands of an Article I trial court with particular expertise if it chose 
to do so.”143  
Consider the rapid expansion of the USPTO’s adjudicatory 
authority since the Federal Circuit’s March 7, 1985 Patlex 
decision. What likely began as a quiet, pragmatic endorsement144 of 
the perceived benefits of the newly created ex parte reexamination 
mechanism has given way to an administrative tribunal that 
adjudicates thousands of patent invalidity disputes (with finality) 
                                                
 141 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 142 564 U.S. at 489. 
 143 50 F.3d at 983 (emphasis added). 
 144 In direct contradiction to McCormick. 
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on a per year basis.145 PTAB power grows by the day, and it is not 
particularly hyperbolic to say so. 
With the public rights designation unchanged after MCM, 
Article III supervision over the PTAB remains not a matter of 
constitutional right, but instead a question of Congressional 
discretion. Given the rise of the PTAB, it is conceivable, per the 
“green light” provided by the Federal Circuit, that the executive 
and legislative branches will remove patent invalidity from the 
Article III courts altogether. Perhaps commentators will scoff at 
this notion; but such commentators are not clairvoyant, nor do they 
have a crystal ball—they cannot predict the composition of the 
next Congress, Senate, or the identity of the next President. What 
appears outlandish today might sound rational tomorrow; the 
whims of the electorate cannot be predicted. 
In footnote 6 of Stern v. Marshall, C.J. Roberts wrote, on 
behalf of the majority, “Crowell may well have additional 
significance in the context of expert administrative agencies that 
oversee particular substantive federal regimes, but we have no 
occasion to and do not address those issues today.”146 Those issues 
are now before the Court.147 To be sure, the nation stands at a 
crossroads. 
Basic to the constitutional structure established by the 
Framers was their recognition that “[the] accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” 
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S at 57 (1982) (plurality), quoting The 
Federalist No. 47, p. 300 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (J. Madison). 
                                                
 145 Consider, for example, Stern, 564 U.S. at 502–03. (“A statute may no more 
lawfully chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate 
it entirely. Slight encroachments create new boundaries from which legions of 
power can seek new territory to capture.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146 564 U.S. at 490. 
 147 See, e.g., Justices Want USPTO to Weigh In On PTAB Constitutionality, 
LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/896824/justices-
want-uspto-to-weigh-in-on-ptab-constitutionality. 
